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ABSTRACT
This paper offers a theoretical framework for studying the inter-
actions of energy prices and economic growth. The incorporation of
energy prices and quantities in a macroeconomic setting focuses on (1)
the aggregate technology; (2) the interdependence of energy producers
and consumers in the world economy; and (3) the asset markets as the
channel through which energy price changes affect output and capital
accumulation. While several existing studies consider aspects of these
issues, none provides a synthesis. In this analysis, a theoretically
sound model of an oil price increase in the world economy is presented,
carefully treating topics (1) — (3). The model is solved with computer
simulation, as it is far too complex to yield analytical solutions.
Jeffrey Sachs




IENERGY AND GROWTH UNDER FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATES:
A SIMULATION STUDY
1. INTRODUCTION
The macroeconomic events of recent years have placed a very
heavy strain on existing models of the macroeconomy. The dramatic
rise in real energy prices, in particular, requires re-thinking of
current models along a number of lines. First, higher energy prices
raise new issues for aggregate supply in the short- and long-run.
Energy price increases induce a short-run production decline for
given capital stock, as well as a decline in net capital accumula-
tion and long-run capital intensity. Second, the energy price
increases raise a host of international economic issues. Worldwide
interest rates and global production shift when increases in energy
prices tranfer income to the high-saving OPEC region. The reper-
cussions of the global shifts must be studied in a global context.
Finally, energy price increases interact with asset market prices
in important ways. Increased attention must be paid to the effect
of flexible exchange rates in reacting to, and facilitating adjust-
ment to higher energy prices.
Existing theoretical and econometric models are deficient in
addressing these important effects. Progress has been made in each
area, but an adequate synthesis of results is wanting. An important
reason for this limitation is that theoretical models that adequately
treat the supply side, capital accumulation, international reper-
cussion effects, and asset markets, are too complex to solve analy-
tically. The strategy in this paper is to present a theoretically
sound model of an oil price increase under flexible exchange rates,
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and to solve the model by taking refuge in computer simulation. The
goal of this paper is methodological -- to demonstrate the feasibility
of an integrated approach to growth and energy -- rather than empi-
rical. No attempt is made here to calibrate precisely the simulation
model, though such an attempt is now underway.
Let us consider each of the three problem areas. Economists
have increasingly recognized the need to integrate the production
technology into models of aggregate output (cf. [5 1, [1O}, [16}),
and to explore the effects of alternative technological assumptions
on adjustment. There is still, however, an inadequate integration
of short-run adjustment and long-run growth in most applied macro-
economic analyses, and with respect to energy the deficiency is
particularly acute. While demand or monetary disturbances may
influence short-run output with little effect on the growth path,
energy prices by nature affect both short-run and long-run output,
the latter through the effects on capital accumulation and savings.
As higher energy prices reduce the profitability of investment, the
long-term effect of higher energy prices is a reduction in capital
intensity of production. The long-run decline is reflected immediately
in the short-run investment rate.
Equity markets provide the link between the long-run capital
intensity of production and the short-run investment decisions of
firms. In the simulation model, the investment function is built
upon Tobin's [24] insight that value-maximizing firms will increase
their investment rate when the valuation of equity claims to their
capital rises relative to the replaëernent cost of capital. The ratio
of these two prices is widely known as Tobin's q; the link between
investment and q will be formally justified. Because q is itself
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a function of the expected stream of future capital earnings, a
decline in anticipated earnings causes a fall in current q and current
investment. We shall see that an increase in energy prices depresses
q and causes a sharp fall in capital accumulation. The extent of
the fall depends on the nature of technology.
The second concern for sound modelling of OPEC disturbances is
that woriwide variables will change with a worldwide shock. A
"small economy" analysis that takes world interest rates and income
as given following a price shock is partial at best, and probably
misleading. Similarly, we cannot very well study the post-shock
exchange rate between two oil-importing economies by studying a
model of only one economy. Yet various authors have argued that the
exchange rate of a non-OPEC economy vis-a-vis other such economies
will move in a particular direction after an OPEC price shock, even
though the conclusion cannot be true for all such economies. In
our simulation study, we include two growing, industrialized economies
in addition to OPEC, so that we may explicitly analyze movements
of their bilateral exchange rate.
The multilateral aspect of the model also permits us to address
the important issues of policy co-ordination and repercussion effects
between large, open economies. We reach some surprising conclusions
about the transmission of policies across national boundaries. In
particular, a fiscal expansion may well be beggar-thy-neighbour if
real wages are sufficiently rigid in the industrial economies.
Our third concern is the proper treatment of asset market
prices in a study of the OPEC shocks. The recent advances in
"efficient market theory" of exchange rates, equity prices, and the
commodity price level demonstrate that asset prices aggregate market
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expectations of future economic developments. I have mentioned q
in this context. Similarly, the current bilateral exchange rate
can be written as a discounted stream of the relative money stocks
in the two economies (cf. [17]), and the price level is tied to the
discounted stream of expected nominal money services in a single
economy (see [2]). Because asset prices translate expected future
economic developments into current decisions, it is now well appre-
ciated that a sound model of expectations is crucial. Therefore,
I adopt the perfect foresight assumption throughout the simulation
model. This approach has several advantages: (1) it avoids the
"Lucas critique" by making explicit how agents' behavior will change
with shifts in policy regime; (2) it rules out the possibility of
systematically profitable arbitrage given known market conditions;
and (3) it is the appropriate base case for optimizing agents in
a non-stochastic environment.
As I will indicate, the perfect foresight assumption raises
interesting methodological issues for simulation. Because equity
prices, the exchange rate, and the consumption price level are valued
according to the entire future path of various endogenous and
exogenous variables, it is difficult to find the initial conditions
for these prices. Technically, the models pose two-point-boundary-
value problems, for which final but not initial asset prices are
known. Elsewhere, I have helped to implement the method of
"multiple-shooting," common in certain physical sciences, for the
solution of economic simulations (see [12]). This method, I will
show, is very powerful in solving the large two-country growth
model in this paper.
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A complete description of a related two-country growth model,
but, without energy inputs or money balances, may be found in [13].
At various points, I will refer to that study for detailed discussion.
A similar two-country model of trade, with perfect foresight but
without energy and growth is Obstfeld [191. In this paper, the
general equilibrium model is set forth in Section 2, some analytical
comparative static results are described in Section 3. In Section 4,
the full dynamic effects of an OPEC shock on output and growth are
studied through simulation under a variety of labor market assumptions.
We will reconfirm in a general equilibrium setting the results of
an earlier study by this author, on the importance of the labor market
setting for adjustments to the oil shock. Furthermore, we will
illustrate how alternative technological assumptions alter the
growth paths of the economies. Importantly, we will analyze the
transmission of macroeconomic policies across national borders.
Conclusions and extensions to the model are discussed in Section 5.
2. A MODEL OF ENERGY, FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATES, AND TWO-COUNTRY GROWTH
We consider two growing industrial economies, linked through
international commodity and financial markets. Each economy produces
a single output, which it consumes, sells abroad for consumption,
and uses for domestic capital formation. The domestic and foreign
goods are imperfect consumption substitutes, with each household's
consumption bundle depending on the relative price of the two goods.
Each country uses only its own output for capital formation.
Households save in the form of home money balances and domestic
and foreign equity claims to capital. We assume that each country's
money balances yield transaction services to the country's agents.
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These services are represented by the inclusion of real money balances
in the household utility function. Foreign money balances yield no
utility. Implicitly international transactions are mediated in
equity rather than money (see [i9} for a similar approach). Equity
claims are valued for the stream of real income attached to their
ownership. With no transactions costs in international financial
markets and perfect foresight instantaneous holding yields of home
and foreign equity are always equalized. We abstract from outside
interest-bearing nominal securities, such as government bonds.
Current production uses labor inputs, energy, and the existing
stock of reproducible capital. Households supply labor inelastically
to the labor market, and competitive firms hire labor to the point
where the marginal product of labor equals the wage. Short-run
rigidities in nominal or real wages may induce labor market dis-
equilibrium and temporary, involuntary unemployment (in [13J we
reinterpret the employment fluctuations as movements along the
household's (intertemporal) labor-leisure trade off). Firms similarly
purchase energy inputs according to profit-maximizing criteria.
Investment over time in reproducible capital proceeds according to
the value-maximizing program of the firm.
Energy requirements are satisfied through imports from OPEC.
OPEC in turn uses its oil revenues to consume the output of the two
developed economies, and to accumulate equity claims in the two
economies for later consumption. We abstract from OPEC's own develop-
ment strategy, and indeed from the nature of OPEC's pricing decision
itself. The real price of oil, in terms of OPEC's consumption bundle,
is exogenous.
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Equilibrium requires that output supply and demand balance,
that the ex ante yields of home and foreign equities be the same,
and that the home and foreign demands for outside money balances
equal their respective supplies. Loosely speaking, the world real
rate of return adjusts to balance global demand and supply, while
the terms of trade (or real exchange rate) shifts demand between the
two economies to balance each country's output market. Home and
foreign equity prices adjust to equate yields on equity claims
today and in the future. Finally, the foreign and home price levels
adjust to equate money supplies and demands. The model as written
solves for home (P) and foreign prices levels (p*), and the terms
of trade (II = P/EP*), (where E is the exchange rate, in units of
home currency per unit of foreign currency, and * indicates
"foreign").
The nominal exchange rate is given simply at E = (P*/P). (1/u).
Obviously, the model can be re-written to solve for E, one price
level, and the terms of trade, with the other price level determined
residually.
It is important to remember that equilibrium in this model is
a full, intertemporal Nash equilibrium as characterized in Brock [2 ].
Agents make current decisions based upon their anticipations of the
entire future paths of prices, which they take as given. By the
perfect foresight assumption, all agents' anticipations must be the
same, and must be equal to the prices that actually unfold over time
(barring future, unanticapated shifts in exogenous variables). Thus,
to solve for q0, q, E0, P0, and P at the initial time, we must
solve for sequences {q}, P} and {P}, i=O, 1,. ..,
By examining the intertemporal maximization problems of households
and firms, the dependence of today's action on all future prices
can be made clear.
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In setting forth the model, I will present the home country
equations only, with the understanding that comparable equations exist
for the foreign economy. The entire model, for both countries and
OPEC is presented in Table 1, p. 20. Aside from the wage equation
and the OPEC consumption equation, the model is written in continuous
time. All equations are discretized for the simulations.
A. The Household
On the household side, we postulate a Sidrauski-Brock infinitely
lived and growing household, which maximizes an additively separable
intertemporal utility function in goods and real money balances:
Jet L U(C, , M/P)dt. is the rate of pure time discount,
0
and LF is the number of household members at any time (with LF/LF = n).
CM is per capita domestic consumption of the foreign final good.
(Al]. quantity variables will be written in intensive form, per
unit of L, unless otherwise noted). There is no utility to leisure,
so that notional labor supply is LF. Since labor markets do not
necessarily clear instantaneously, however, we may have total manhours
MH < LF. We define L = MH/LF as the employment rate, and U = l-L
as the unemployment rate. Households have full knowledge of the
rationing in the labor market, and they optimize according to their
labor market constraints. For simplicity, we assume that rationing
is uniform across agents, and appears in the form of reduced hours.
Since L does not directly enter U(.), there are no goods-market
spillover effects of labor rationing, aside from the direct effects
caused by a reduction in human wealth.
Let A1 represent the households' capita stock of equity
wealth in units of the home good, and r be the instantaneous yield
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on equity claims. The familiar intertemporal budget constraint is:
( 1) AM = rAM + TL - C - CM/ri - nAM.
where r is the rate of labor taxation (there are no other taxes).
We assume that per capita government expenditure on final consump-
tion always adjusts to keep G =
-r-L. In addition to direct expendi-
ture, the government makes lump-sum transfer payments to households,
financed by money creation: T = (I + nM)/P. The discounted value
T
of all future transfers, W , may be written as
e ds[ + nM)/P]dt.
Integration by parts reveals in the Cobb-Douglas case that wT is
given simply by (i/(-n) - l)(M/P).21
Now, let A be total per capita wealth, with
( 2) A = AM + + H +
with
H = Je r-n)ds(l)(W)L dt (Human Wealth)
wT = T dt (Present Value of Transfers)
Using ( 1) and ( 2), and the definitions of H and wT, we can re-write
the budget constraint as:
( 3) A = (r-n)A - [C + CM/ri + (r+/P)M/P]
We now see that "full" consumption CF in any period is equal to
goods consumption, plus the opportunity cost of real balances. The
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shadow price of real balances is the nominal interest rate
i = r + P/p, which represents the income foregone in holding wealth
in the form of money balances.
We may specialize further, by writing U() as a constant-
relative-risk aversion function of a linear homogeneous function
+'
of C, cM and M/p
( 4) U() = [y(C,cM,M/p)]l 1
1-a
log[W(C,CM,M/p] a = 1
(for details see [13]; for a similar approach, see [19]). Now, it
is easy to show that intertemporal optimization makes
( 5) a(1'/Y) = (r - - P,/P)
where P is a true price index for
. Note that CF =
In this study, we proceed with the Cobb-Douglas case for ' and TJ():
= Ca( 5)(CM)()(s)(M,p)5 , and a = 1. In this case, consump-
tion expenditures on the three goods in each period is a fixed
proportion of CF, and full consumption C is linear in wealth:
( 6) (a) CF = (cS-n)A
(b) C = ct(l-s)CF
(c) cM = (la)(ls)CF/fl
(d) i(M/P) = sCF
Very inportantly, 6) (d) is the utility-maximizing money demand
schedule. Note finally that by the value of wT shown above, total
wealth is
( 7) A = i/(6-n)].(M/P) + AM + H.
B. The Firm
Under certainty and perfect competition, the strategy of value
maximization for the firm is unanimously
agreed upon by shareholders.
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We follow Hayashi's 18 } argument that such a strategy, under tech-
nical conditions now described, leads to the investment rule
( 8) J = J(q)K
where J is gross (per capita) capital formation, and K is the pre-
existing capital stock (per capita). q is, again, the price of equity
relative to the price of physical capital, and the latter in this model
is just equal to the price of output. The investment schedule arises
from an assumed cost of adjustment to new investment which makes
the marginal cost of investment rise with the investment rate JIK.
To be specific, suppose that total investment expenditure I
equals J. [1 + (/Kfl where () is the per unit adjustment cost,
p'>O. Since the market values new capital according to the real
equity price q, the firmts instantaneous change in value due to
capital formation J is simply:
( 9) dV = qJ - J[l + 4'(J/Kfl
If ( 9) is maximized with respect to J, we see that the firm
equates q with 1 + d/dJ[(J•fl, the marginal adjustment cost. Equa-
tion ( 8) is then simply derived. In the specific and useful case
of (J/K) = (0/2)•(J/K), i.e., linear adjustment costs with constant
J and I are given by:
(10)
(a) J =
(b) I = (ql)2.K/(2.
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For a given K, the firms should behave as a simple short-run
profit maximizer, equating marginal products and factor costs of all
variable factors (this assumes that these factors are strictly
variable, i.e., instantaneously and costlessly adjustable). In this
study we assume that there are two variable factors, labor and
energy, and that total output is produced according to the CRS,
neoclassical production function Q = F[L,N,KJ (note that the function
is written in intensive form, per unit Lv). A number of recent
studies have investigated empirically the form of this three-factor
production function to determine the degree of substitutability of
energy with the other factors, (see [1 }, [6 ], [7 ] and [14]).
Some authors have suggested that K and L are weakly separable from
B, writing Q as a function of value-added V(K,L) and
N: Q = F{V(K,L)N]. Others argue that the appropriate assumption
is Q = F[K(K,N),L]. In this form, effective capital K is composed
of physical capital with a particular energy rating. The K function
may be putty-putty, putty-clay, or strictly fixed proportion. In
the simulations, we will investigate a variety of putty-putty models;
I take up the far more complicated perfect foresight putty-clay
model in [22].





In the important special case of Q = min[V(K,L),N], N does not
exist; (11) becomes = ____ = — where P is the value-added deflator.
N v V
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C. Asset Market Equilibrium
Domestic and foreign equity claims to capital are perfect
substitutes in portfolios. Their ex ante instantaneous yields
must be equated throughout time. Unexpected shocks may induce
differing extraordinary capital gains and losses on the assets
only at the instant of the disturbance, as equity prices re-adjust
to equalize all future rates of return. The real instantaneous
yield on domestic equity is the sum of the dividend yield and
capital gains:
(12) r = /q + Div/qK
Similarly,
(13) r* = j*/q* + Div*/q*K*
Now r and r* are thepure yields in home and foreign good units
respectively. The foreign yield in home good units is
r* - n/n (II = P/EP*). World asset market equilibrium requires:
(14) r = r*
Note that with i r + P/P and i r* + */p* , (14) implies
the standard uncovered interest arbitrage condition of perfect
foresight and perfect capital mobility:
(15) 1 = i + B/E
It remains to specify Div and Div*. For convenience (and
without loss of generality in the absence of interest and corpo-
rate income taxes) I assume that all investment is equity financed.
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For gross capital formation J and geometric depreciation dK, new
equity issues raise q(J-dK). Total dividends in domestic goods
units are:
W(16) Div = q(J-dK) + Q - () L - () N - I
One of the central relationships of the model emerges from (12)
and (16). If we assume that the real price of equity does not
explode at t- (i.e., if we rule out speculative bubbles), Tobin's
q may be written as the discounted value of future cash flow per
3/
unit of today's capital.
(17) qK = Je5))d [Q - (W/P) L - N - I]dt
D. Output Market Equilibrium
Households in all countries grow at rate n (with different
growth rates, one economy would asymptotically dominate the world
economy). Thus, the ratio of potential labor in all economies is
a constant, and without confusion we may normalize all per capita
variables in all countries in terms of home potential labor
LF.
Consider for example foreign imports of the home good. cM will
represent foreign imports per L . With e (LF*/LF), CM /e iS
foreign per capita imports per unit of foreign potential labor.
Now we may write the equilibrium conditions. Let OPEC consump-
tion per LF of the domestic good equal OPECD, and of the foreign
good equal OPEC*. Total demand for the home good is then
+ I + G + CM* + OPECD which must equal Q. Similarly,
= + 1* + G* + C' + OPEC*. The nature of OPEC demand is
described in Part E.
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E. Balance of Payments
At any moment, world financial claims on the domestic economy
change because of current account imbalances and capital gains and
losses on existing assets. Let represent foreign claims on the
domestic income stream (the precise composition of is described
below). Then along the transition path, the change in equals
domestic income [Q - rF - (PN/P)N} less domestic expenditure
(C + CM/il + G + I). Suppose now that W' is held in the form of
domestic equity: wF = qZ. Thus (Z/K) of the home capital stock
is foreign owned. Then = q + Z, and
(18) = [M/ - cM - OPECD - (PN/P)NJ + Div(Z/K) + qZ
or
= Trade Deficit + Service Account Deficit
+ Capital Gains.
Because of the assumption of perfect capital mobility there
is no guide as to how the various economies will hold their financial
wealth. With all rates of return equalized, there is no motive for
one asset preference over another; along any perfect foresight
adjustment path all portfolios earn rate r. The portfolio composi-
tion only matters at the time of unexpected shocks, when assets
experience differing, extraordinary capital gains and losses. Both
to simplify bookkeeping, and to mimic in a stylized way the under-
diversification of international portfolios, I assume that OPEC holds
Z and Z* claims on domestic and foreign capital, while domestic and
foreign portfolios contain only equity claims on the own economy.
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Since OPEC owns Z, the equity wealth of the home economy is q(K-Z),
and of the foreign economy, q*(K*Z*).
F. OPEC Demand
The only matter of concern here is OPEC's savings and consumption
decision. Models of OPEC pricing, cartel behavior, and oil depletion
are crucial adjuncts to this study, if we are to accurately forecast
long-run trends. Unfortunately, these issues are beyond the scope
of this paper, and beyond the expertise of the author (for a
sophisticated recent discussion, see Nordhaus [18}). The principal
fact to be captured here is that OPEC consumption appears to lag
significantly behind increases in OPEC revenue, following a rise
in oil prices. There are a number of reasons for this, including
costs of adjustment to rapid changes in consumption levels, and
perhaps more important, OPEC members' awareness that current high
oil revenues are transitory. Both factors induce short-run wealth
accumulation, in order to smooth future consumption.
OPEC's per capita real oil wealth in home good units, may
be written as the discounted value of future revenues:
(19) = Je
OPEC equity wealth is qZ + q*Z*/ll , and total OPEC wealth WOPEC
+ qZ + q*Z*/ll . To capture lags in OPEC short-run consumption,
while allowing long-run consumption to match that of the developed
economies, we write a stock adjustment equation of the form:
(20) OPEC = X(OPEC) + (l-X)(-n)Wo
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As A approaches 1, OPEC has more prolonged trade surpluses following
a rise in oil prices. When A = 0, the equation matches ( 6 ) (a)
exactly.
The division of OPEC spending between home and foreign goods
is given according to:
(21)
(a) OPECD = E(fl)OPEC
(b) OPEC* = (OPECOPECD)r[
G. Labor Market Equilibrium
The short-run macroeconomic adjustment to an oil price increase
depends crucially on wage behavior. To the extent that workers attempt
to preserve real consumption wages, firms' profit margins are squeezed
and unemployment results. If nominal wages are highly indexed, any
attempts by the monetary authority to reduce real wages through
inflation will be vitiated. On the other hand, if nominal wage growth
is sticky, an inflationary policy will successfully moderate unem-
ployment, while a contractionary response to the price hike will
exacerbate the employment shortfall. These points have been exten-
sively discussed in { 4 ], [20] , and [211.
These results may be interpreted in terms of exchange rate
policy. To the extent that wages are indexed to the consumer price
level, an exchange rate depreciaiton through monetary expansion will
simply raise home wages and prices in equiproportion; there will
be no expansionary gain in real output. If, contrariwise, the rate
of real wage growth can be slowed through exchange rate depreciation,
output will expand, with increases in investments and exports.
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At most, nominal and real wage rigidity are temporary phenomena,
as shifts in the employment rate will drive wages towards full-
employment levels. The empirical evidence on OECD wages during
1973-79 strongly suggests that real wage growth moderated after the
first OPEC price hike, but only after years of high inflation and
sustained unemployment in most countries (see [20] for evidence).
To model short-run rigidities and long-run labor market clearing,
I propose the following expression:
(22) =
Nominal wages are indexed to consumer prices, c, but with a partial
lag; lOOp percent indexation is on current inflation, and 100 (l-p)
percent on lagged inflation. The overall rate of wage change is also
responsive to the employment rate, with elasticity y . Consider
a few special cases. With y = 0 and p = 1 the real wage is
fixed, for = W]/P . With y>0 and p = 1 , the real
wage responds to employment, but not to a change in inflation:
= (Wl/Pcl)LY . In general, real wage change is a negative
function of accelerating inflation as well as unemployment. (22)
can be re-written as:
(23) (Wt/P) =
Each one percent acceleration in inflation, for given L, reduces
real wages by 100 (l-p) percent. Finally, note that as we
will have L-'-l, with full employment guaranteed.
The true consumer price level for each economy can be written
according to the underlying household U(S) function. In the specific
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Cobb-Douglas case treated here, we write P = Pa(P*E)), withC
4/
a the share of domestic consumption on the domestic good. -
H. The Entire Model
The full model is presented in Table 1. A list of variable
definitions appears at the end of the table.
The model is written in a special form in Table 1, to anticipate
the simulations. Consider a variable such as human wealth H,
described in (2 j in the text, and equations (5 ) and (7 ) in
the table. H may be defined directly as the present value of the
future stream of labor income, as in the text. Alternatively, it
may be defined by two equations, in time derivative form, as in
the table. Differentiating (2 ), we find cI = (r-n)H - ()(l--r)L.
This equation and the transversality condition urn H et = 0,
t +
are equivalent to the original equation for H. In effect, the
transversality condition imposes the initial condition on the
differential equation to insure that the solution for H is equal
to its value in integral form.
In this model, the "asset variables" q, q*, H, H*, P, P* and
all may be written in integral form, or in differential form
plus a transversality condition. In almost all cases, it is easier
to simulate the model using the latter representation. As I describe
in Section 4, the model in time-derivative form poses a standard
two-point boundary value problem, for which solution techniques are
known.
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Table 1. The Complete Model
A. The Household
(1) C = (5-n)A
(2) C* = (6_n)A*
(3) A = q(K-Z) + (M/P)(i/(cS-n)) + H
(4) A* = q(K_Z*) + (M*/P*)(i*/(5n)) + H*
(5) H = (r-n)H - (W/P)(l-T)L
(6) 11* = (r_n)H* - (W*/P*)(l_r*)L*
(7) urn e'1tH = 0
(8) lim e_*_h1)tH* = 0
t+co
(9) = CD(ll,i).C
(10) (M/P) = rn(rt,i)C
(11) Cm = (C - CD - iM/P)rr
(12) CD = CD(ll,i*).C*
(13) (4*/p*) = m(ll,i*).C*
(14) C = (C* - CD* -
B. The Firm
























I = J(1 +
1* = J*(1 +
J = J(q).K
= Jw(q).K*
K = J - SK - nK
= J* - SK - nK*
Market Equilibrium
r = q/q + Div/qK
r* = q*/qc + Div*/q*K*
E = (p/p*). (1/11)
r = r* 11/fl
i = r + (PIP)

















OPECt = (l-X)(-n)w0 + XOPECt1
OPEC = OPECD + OPEC*/T[
OPECD = OPECD(ll).OPEC
= qZ + q*z*/n +
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(33) e_l't(M/P) = 0
-(34) e r (M*/P*) = 0
(35) = q(J-dK) + Q - (W/P)L - (PN/P)N - I
(36) = q*(J*_dK*) + Q* - (W*/P*)L* - (PN*/P*)N* - 1*
(37) e1tq = 0
-(38) e q* 0
D. Output Market Equilibrium
(39) Q=CD+I+G+CM+OpECD
(40) Q* = CD* + 1* + G* + cM + OPEC
E. Balance of Payments Equations
(41) qZ = [CM/il - CM - OPECD - (PN/P)NJ + Div (Z/K)
(42) q*z* = [CMII - cM - OPEC* - (PN*/P*)N*] + Div*(Z*/K*)
= (rn)WN - (PN/P)(N+N*)








1t/wt_l = d/c )P(pC1/pC2)lP) L1t t-l












The following variables are measured per potential labor:
A Wealth
C Consumption
Home Consumption of Home Goods
cM Home Consumption of Foreign Goods




I Gross Investment Expenditures













i Nominal Interest Rate
P Home Good Price
Consumer Price
Home Price of Energy
q Equity Price
r Real Interest Rate
W Wage
II Final Good Terms of Trade (P/EP*)
Labor Tax Rate
Parameters:
n Labor Force Growth Rate
Rate of Time Discount
d Depreciation
Investment Adjustment Cost
a Share of Home Goods in Consumption Basket
a Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion
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The model has 55 equations, but in fact only 54 are independent.
This can be demonstrated by reducing the system to its minimal state-
space representation. Let X be the vector of exogenous variables,
and S be the vector <Z, Z', K, K*, p, p*, q, H, H*> . After
discretizing the dynamic equations, it may be shown that the model
5/
reduces to a nonlinear system of the form:
(24) S÷1 = F(St, X, Xt+i)
All remaining variables of the model are implicit functions of
S.c, X, and in particular, q can be written as such a function.
Thus, the transversality condition on q. automatically holds when
the transversality conditions on the other asset prices in St are
satisfied.
The transversality conditions are not needed to reduce he
system to the form in (24). In Table 1, equations (7), (8), (33), (34)
(37), and (48) impose additional constraints on the dynamics. The
six constraints impose implicit initial conditions on p, p", q,
H, H*. These asset variables always adjust in any period to guarantee
that (24) will satisfy the transversality conditions as the system
integrates forward. It is readily seen that the initial conditions
are functions of the current values of Z, Z, K, and K*, and the
entire future path of X. Note that the initial conditions of Z,
Z, K, and K are given from past history. Since they are stock




The steady-state growth path of the model depends on the
equilibrium distribution of wealth. Higher domestic per capita
holdings of equity claims raise home wealth and the home terms
of trade (II) in the long-run. Because the steady-state distribution
of wealth depends upon the entire adjustment path, it can be found
only in simulation. Fortunately, important aspects of the steady
state such as the long-run capital stock, rate of return, and product
wage, do not depend on wealth or II. To discuss comparative statics,
I proceed in two steps, first asking how a parameter change alters
the key variables that are not functions of the wealth distribution,
and then how a shift in wealth affects the steady state. The
discussion here is brief; a more detailed analysis of many of these
points may be found in [131.
The most important anchor in equilibrium lies in the savings
behavior of the Sidrauski-Brock infinitely-lived household. From
( 4) and ( 5) we note that per capita consumption is in steady-state
equilibrium ('1=O) only when r = r* = S, which is the modified golden
rule in this economy. Since the rate of return on equity equals
the rate of time discount, we may readily determine the long-run
capital-labor ratio in each economy. To do so, note that K=O
requires J/K = n+d. From (lO)(a), we have = 1 + (n+d). (A bar
over any variable signifies its steady-state value.) Since r=S,
and Div/K = r in steady state, K adjusts until the dividend yield
equals the required rate of return.
What is that level of K? From the dividend expression (16), we
may show that steady-state Div/qK equals [Q - (W/P)L - P/P)]/qK +
where the latter term is a function in . Using Euler's equation,
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the first part of this expression is simply FK/3. Since
FK/ + = 5, FK is constant across steady states. We may proceed
further. Full-employment is a condition of steady state; the product
wage adjusts to force L=l, and Q = F[L,K,N]. Since 3Q/aN =
it is straightforward to use the output equation and this first-
order condition to derive the dual expression FK = G(PN/P,K), with
G1<0, G2<0. Since dPK=0, dK/d(PN/P) =
-G1/G2 < 0.
Consider the long-run decline in capital intensity, following
an energy price increase, for a variety of aggregate technologies.
In Chart 2, some common functional forms are examined. The analyti-
cal expressions are log-linear approximations for the percentage
decline in K. The numerical illustrations are for a doubling of
N'' assuming: initial labor share, .57, capital share, .38,
and energy share, .05. Observe that the long-run decline in K is
greatest in the case of capital-energy complementarity (cf. [1],
9J).
We assume in the simulations that OPEC sets the relative oil
price S in terms of a bundle of home and foreign goods. Since
= SP(P)1, we see that = For given S, an
improvement in the terms of trade reduces the real cost of energy
inputs. Thus, a rise in long-run IT can moderate the decline K
following an oil-price hike.
Let us turn to the long-run effects of money growth in this
model. Since is determined by the long-run required rate of
return, higher i(= M/M) and higher inflation have no effect on the
long-run capital intensity of production. Steady-state changes in
i cause equal increases in i(di=di), with real money balances M/P
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Table 2. Long-Run Decline in Capital Intensity Following Doubling
of Input Price: Alternative Technologies
Technology
Q = F[K,L,N1 FK at Full Employment1 Percent Decline
(L = 1) in K after 9il
Price Shock
1. Q = min[V(K,L),N] (l-cs)(lPN/P)K 8.9
V(K,L) = K1L
2. Q = (K+)lLa (l-)K- 17.5
= min[K,EI1
3. Q = K(L+)a (1-a)K 0.0
L = min[L,EI
4. Q = [1L+2K+ (1-p1-2)N] 'i 2 1K+2 (l-p)/p
(General CES with where
a = l/1+p) =
1 FK = [Q-(W/P)L(PN/P)N]/K, where W/P adjusts to guarantee
= W/P at L = 1, and where Q/N =
2
Assuming initial shares for labor (.57), capital (.38), energy (.05),
L = 1, and FK = .11.
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adjusting to keep iM/P constant. The result can be made much
stronger. As long as nominal wages are fully indexed, and utility
is Cobb-Douglas in money and goods, the path of money growth has no
effect on any real variables besides M/P and the inflation rate
itself! This means that changes in inflation cannot affect the path
of the real exchange rate. A one-shot unanticipated increase in the
rate of money growth causes an initial jump in P and E of equal
proportion, and subsequent higher inflation and exchange rate depre-
ciation. The decline in real balances does not lead to increased
6/
hoarding, as in some models of the open economy.
Finally, we come to the determination of the long-run terms of
trade. Here the crucial determinants are the distribution of world
equity claims and the division between public and private spending.
Since we assume that government consumption falls exclusively on
home goods while private consumption falls on home goods and imports,
an increase in C that crowds out equal C causes an excess demand
for home goods at the initial TI; a labor-tax-financed fiscal expan-
sion raises Ir. Starting in a steady state, with fully flexible
real wages, a fiscal expansion raises II with no consequences over
7/
time for the capital stock or international wealth flows.
The second determinant of TI is the world distribution of wealth,
which determines the world distribution of spending (as different
countries have differing marginal propensities to spend on home and
foreign goods). Home country wealth is given in ( 7) as
q(K-Z) + H + [i/(3-n)](M/P). In steady state, H is the capitalized
value of after-tax wage payments: 1! = (W/P)(l-T)/(S-n), and the
product wage W/P is a function of and T. Since K is itself a
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function of the main determinants of home wealth are Z and
In general, a drop in Z relative to Z induces a fall in TI.
A rise in shifts wealth to OPEC, and the effect on II depends
on OPEC consumption preferences.
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4. SIMULATION RESULTS
A variety of simulations are now presented, aiming at:
(1) an understanding of the general equilibrium effects of an OPEC
price increase; and (2) an analysis of policy responses to an input
price increase. Five simulations are treated in detail, though a
number of further studies have been made. In the first, the price
hike is studied assuming identical developed economies and fully
flexible wages and prices. In the following simulation, I point
out the implications of significant domestic oil production in one
of the two developed economies. Next, the mirror-image assumption
for the two economies is re-introduced but the assumption of slug-
gish real wage adjustment is added. The final two simulations
continue with the assumption of short-run wage rigidity, and
consider the possibility of expansionary monetary and fiscal poli-
cies to combat the unemployment following an input price rise.
Attention is paid to the repercussion effects on the other economy
of domestic macroeconomic expansion.
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In all cases, the simulation model is solved by the method of
multiple shooting. As I described above, six transversality condi-
tions must be employed to find the initial conditions for q, M/P,
M*/P*, H, H*, and wN. For any initial vector of these variables
the model may be integrated forward, but only for a unique starting
vector will the system converge to a steady-state. For all other
starting conditions, the models diverge explosively from the steady-
state. Technically, the difference equation system possesses strict
saddlepoint stability. When we linearize the transition matrix F
in S41 = F(S, X, X÷i) of equation (24), six eigenvalues are found
to be outside of the unit circle. These correspond to the six
implicit initial conditions on the asset price vector required for
convergence.
The general method of "shooting" provides a straight-forward
technique for finding the initial conditions. We divide the state
vector St into components r and , with r = <q, M/P, M*/P*, H, H*,
and E = <Z,Z*,K,K*,...> , with the precise specification of
E depending on parameter values in the model. Using the transi-
tion function in (24), there is an implicit relationship between
rN and F0, and {X}0N:
(25) rN = G(r0, E0, (Xj}joN).
Now a condition for convergence to the steady state is
urn = r. Our goal is to find F0 such that
N+co
rrN = G(r0, {Xj}j0 N for N very large. This is a set
of non-linear equations, which can be solved by numerical procedures.
In "shooting," a guess is made for i', the system is integrated
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forward until N, and r - FN is evaluated. A new guess for F0 is
made based on Newton's method: 1
- rG ,1
— o + ( -
This iterative procedure is continued until r FN within the
specified tolerance. Note that is numerically calculated.
0
Because of the explosive nature of the dynamic system, it is
often impossible to integrate from 0 to N, if the guess for F0 is poor.
To bring the explosiveness under control, the interval [0,N] may
be subdivided, with trial vectors chosen for r and Z at intermediate
points. The system is then integrated over the sub-intervals rather
than over [0,N], so that the instability does not cumulate over the
entire interval. The iterations proceed until FN equals T with the
intermediate guesses mutually consistent. This variant of shooting
is known in the physical sciences as "multiple shooting," and is
used here. Details and references for this solution technique may
be found in [12].
The baseline steady-state conditions for the simulations are
given in Table 3. In all cases, we assume that the technology for
gross output Q is given by min[V(K,L),N], with
°KL = 1 in value
added. I have devoted a separate note to
analyzing the dynamic
implications of alternative technologies (see [22]). The long-run
effects of a price rise with this technology were shown in Section 2.
i7T falls approximately percent for a one percent rise in
N' starting from N' = .05.
In the flexible wage and price case, W/P adjusts at all points
to keep W/P = FL(K,L) at L = 1. Under this condition, the marginal
-35-
Table 3. Key Parameter Values at Initial Steady-State Equilibrium
Labor Share in Gross Output (WL/PQ)
.57
Energy Share in Gross Output (PNN/PQ)
.05
Capital Share in Gross Output
.38


















aKL in value added 1.0
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product of capital may be written as a function of K (or K/L, since
L = 1) and the real price of
energy PN/P: FK = FK(K, N'• In
the case at hand, W/P = aK' • (1 - N'' where a is the share
of labor in value added. Since FK = {Q - (W/P)L - (PN/P)N]/K,
we have FK = (1 - a - (l-a)PN/P)K. Thus, even with fully flexible
real wages, FK is a negative function of at any level of K.
It is clear that both W/P and FK absorb some of the oil shock.
This is to be contrasted with cases of capital-energy or labor-
energy perfect complementarity in which only one factor price is
affected by Indeed with the assumptions here, the percentage
changes in FK and W/P following a rise in are equal,
(assuming L = 1).
If OPEC savings behavior is identical to that of the developed
economies, the oil price increase causes a fall in capital accumula-
tion at the time of the shock. This seems intuitive, since the
fall in FK and FK* should push down q and q*, and reduce the rate
of capital formation. But to nail down the argument, we must
understand why savings falls and consumption rises on a global
scale, as is implied by the fall in global capital accumulation.
The higher oil price se does not reduce global savings, since
the increase in OPEC consumption is matched, at a constant r, by
a decline in household consumption in the developed economies.
But r does not remain constant. With an investment decline,
constant total world consumption, and output fixed in the short
run, there is an excess supply of goods. r falls pushing up
consumption and moderating the decline in q, until output
markets clear. Remember that a fall in r raises both q and
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human wealth, since each is a discounted flow of future income
streams. In the initial period, q and q* fall, household consumption
declines, and OPEC consumption rises by more than the household
decline.
If OPEC has a higher short-run propensity to save out of wealth
than do the developed economies, the rise in OPEC consumption does
not match the fall in household consumption at constant r. The real
interest rate must fall even more in the initial period to clear
output markets. If OPEC spends very little of its new wealth ini-
tially, r may fall enough to actually raise q and q* in the short-
run. Even though K and K* must be lower in the new steady-state,
they rise temporarily in response to OPEC's high saving propensity.
Once OPEC consumption catches up with the revaluation of its oil
wealth, the short-term real interest rate is pushed up, q and q*
fall, and the rise in capital accumulation is reversed.
Thus, the short-run investment response to OPEC under flexible
wages and prices depends crucially on OPEC savings behavior. Remem-
ber from Section 2 that the parameter A describes the lag in OPEC
spending. A = 0 implies identical OPEC and non-OPEC saving beha-
vior, and A = 1 implies fixed real OPEC expenditure independent
of oil prices, (i.e., a zero marginal propensity to consume out
of new wealth). In general, a high A implies a long lag in adjust-
ment of OPEC consumption to higher wealth. Table presents simu-
lation results for a doubling of energy prices under two cases of
OPEC savings behavior. The developed economies are taken to be
identical, so the terms of trade betwen them are fixed at 1.0,
with the two countries' variables adjusting identically to the
OPEC shock. The table therefore lists only the home variable values.
-38-





























All variables except P are measured as percentage deviations from
the pre-shock steady-state growth path; specifically log (x/x)100.
P is [(Pt-Pt l1I00
1Note that the long-run proportional decline in I equals the propor-
tional decline in , since T = (n+d), and T =
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Since real wages are fully flexible, full employment is conti-
nuously maintained. Real wages in each country fall 5.4 percent
at the time of the shock, and decline even more over time as K and
K* fall. Given our assumption of no technical substitution between
V and N in production, gross output is wholly unaffected by the
higher energy prices at the initial point. There is, however, a
major switch in composition of uses of the final output. In the
A = .1 case, q and q* fall sharply, as does household consumption,
while OPEC consumption rises steeply. The fall in home consumption
reduces real money demand, and with given nominal stock, the price
level jumps sharply, by 5.3 percent. Over time, K and K* fall,
household consumption falls more, and the price level creeps upward.
As we have seen, the long-run decline in capital intensity is
governed by the return of (l-c)(l-PN/P)K to its pre-shocic level.
falls 8.9 percent, and therefore falls (l-c) x 8.9 percent, or
3.6 percent. Of course, the higher energy price has no persistent
effect on I, but only on the price level itself. With A =
.1, long-
run C falls 12.Opercent, and P rises in equiproportion.
A higher A has no long-run effect on K or Q, but does affect
short-run investment, and long-run C and P. For a higher A, the
initial interest rate falls more, and the short-run investment decline
is moderated or reversed. Also, as r falls more upon the shock,
households dissave to a greater extent, driving down their stock
of assets. is therefore lower for higher A, making long-run P
higher for given M. With A =
.75, long-run C falls l4.lpercent.
Suppose now that the home economy satisfies a portion of
its oil inputs through domestic production of energy.
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To simplify, we assume an exogenous, permanent, constant flow of
domestic oil equal to one-half of initial energy inputs. Furthermore,
we abstract from all domestic costs of production, assuming a cost-
lessly producible stream of resources. The oil price hike now
induces a windfall in domestic energy wealth (i.e., the discounted
value of future energy production) that in part compensates for the
fall in human wealth and physical wealth occasioned by the rise in
The consumption demand in the oil-producing home economy
falls less than in the foreign economy, and given that output is
fixed in the short-run, its real exchange rate appreciates 1.1 per-
cent. Also, the nominal exchange rate rises by 6.8 percent since
demand for real money balances falls less in the oil-rich than in
the oil-poor economy. The results are given in Table 5.
The smaller energy holdings of the foreign economy do not
lead to larger current account deficits in that economy, even though
it is more udependentv on OPEC. Simply, its larger oil imports
more fully crowd out other forms of consumption, so that the income!
8/
absorption balance is no different for the two economies. In
principle, the higher terms of trade for the oil-rich economy
slightly reduces its real cost of imported oil (see p. 24), so its
long-run capital stock should be marginally higher. This is the
opposite of the "Dutch disease" conclusion that higher domestic
energy holdings reduce an economy's capital stock. The effect on
the capital stock, however, turns out to be wholly unimportant in
the simulations, given the mereO.9 percent long-run terms-of-trade
improvement.
So far I have assumed that the labor market is continuously
in balance. However, I have argued at great length elsewhere
-41-
Table 5. Dynamic Adjustment with Home Production of Oil










































See note at the bottom of Table 4. E is [(Et-Eti)/EiJ.1OO.
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(see [20], for example) that after the OPEC price increase of
1973-74; real wages in most developed economies did not fall suffi-
ciently in the short-run to keep labor fully employed. If real
wages respond sluggishly to unemployment, a major initial effect of
oil price hike is a reduction in employment and output. In the
simulation reported in Table 6, I assume that each 1.0 percent
decline in employment reduces real wages from the previous period
by 1.2 percent. Now, a doubling of oil prices causes an initial
drop in output of 2.0 percent, and investment falls by 7.3 percent.
This compares with a zero initial output drop and a 0.1 percent rise
in investment in the case of fully flexible real wages. The steeper
investment decline derives from two factors. Higher W/P reduces
FK, and thus pushes down q. Also, the decline in aggregate supply
reduces or reverses the fall in short term interest rates, also
driving q down. Finally, note that prices jump by more than in the
flexible real wage case since the demand for real money balances drops.
What is the scope for policy in moderating the short- and long-
run output declines following an oil price shock? To maintain
steady-state per capita output levels, the profitability of capital
at the initial K/L ratio must be restored. Demand management
policies will in general be useless for this purpose, though tax-
and subsidy policies might play a role (of course the desirability
of such policies is another matter). In the short-run there is
far more scope for maintaining output close to potential through
monetary and fiscal policies. Bruno and I, [(4), (21)] have
emphasized the following aspects of short-run policy. If nominal
wages are fully indexed and real wages adjust sluggishly to unem-
ployment, a monetary expansion or exchange rate depreciation will
-43-
Table 6. Dynamic Adjustment with Real Wage Rigidity






























See note at the bottom of Table 4.
'Wage "rigidity" is specified as y = = 1.2 in wage equation,
with p = p = 1.0.
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have no effect on output, but will have a significant inflationary
effect on prices. Fiscal policy can raise output with real wage
rigidity, by favorably shifting the terms of trade, and reducing the
product wage W/P for given levels of the real wages W/P. The
conclusions are reversed for monetary policy if nominal wages are
sluggish, with low levels of wage indexation. Now a monetary expan-
sion induces an exchange rate depreciation, drives down the real
wage, and causes output to rise. Depending on the nature of indexa-
tion, the beneficial effect on output may be very short-lived or
highly persistent. Fiscal policy remains effective at low levels
of wage indexation.
To illustrate the role of exchange rates and macroeconomic
policy following a supply shock, I assume that one developed country
has fully flexible wages and prices while the other has sluggish
wage adjustment, with lags in indexation. Specifically, for the
wage adjustment process in equation (22), p = .25 and y' = .5. The
first economy will have continuous full employment, while the second
will exhibit short-run unemployment following an oil price increase,
and will converge to full employment over time. Starting from a
steady-state with zero (per capita) nominal money stock growth and
constant fiscal expenditure, two policies are tried at the time
of an unexpected OPEC shock: (1) an announced permanent increase
in nominal money growth to one percent per year, taking effect at
the beginning of the second period (i.e., the first period nominal
money stock remains unchanged); and (2) a 10% percent increase in
per capita fiscal expenditure, financed by a balanced-budget increase
in the proportional labor income tax.
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The results of these policies are illustrated in Table 7.
The simplest and most important point is that the home country can
buy a short-run reduction in unemployment, at the expense of a
higher price level or steady-state inflation rate. With a shift
to one percent permanent money growth, unemployment is eliminated
in the first period, but with an 11.4 percent jump in the price
level. The policy works by reducing W/P by 1.6 percent more
than in the base case. Note that the exchange rate depreciates
8.6 percent on impact of the announcement of the policy change,
even before the nominal money stock changes. The first period terms
of trade depreciates 1.0 percent relative to the base case. In the
second period, the lagged indexation mechanism induces a substan-
tial catch-up in the real wage, and much of the reduction in
unemployment is reversed. The economy converges to full employment
with unemployment always slightly below the base case. In the
steady-state, of course, domestic inflation equals the rate of per
capita nominal money stock growth, while the exchange rate depre-
ciates at the same rate. Long-run output and the capital stock
are unchanged by the expansionary monetary policy.
Given the assumption of continuous labor market clearing in
the foreign economy, the expansionary policy at home has virtually
no effect on output or foreign prices. The most important effect
transmitted abroad is a real exchange rate appreciation, which
raises foreign real wages relative to the base case, (in the first
period, W*/PC* is .5 percent above the base level). If real wage
adjustment were also sluggish abroad, the foreign terms of trade
improvement would translate into an output expansion, so that the
- Base Case: No change in per capita G or M;
M - Monetary Expansion: 1% growth rate in M,
announced in 1970, to begin 1970-71;
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monetary expansion would be positively transmitted. A second
transmitted effect, which turns out to be insignificant in simula-
tion, is a slight reduction in the world interest rate following
the monetary expansion.
While expansionary monetary policy operates through an infla-
tionary reduction of real wages in the home country, the primary
effect of fiscal policy is to raise home output through a terms of
trade improvement. Since fiscal expenditure falls solely on home
goods, while it crowds out household expenditure on home and foreign
goods, a balanced-budget increase in G induces an excess demand for
home goods at the initial prices, and thus raises II. For a given
real wage W/P, the product wage W/P is reduced, since
W/P = (W/Pc)n1. For a ten percent, permanent, unanticipated fiscal
expansion in the year of an oil shock, TI is raised 2.2 percent rela-
tive to the base case. The nominal exchange rate depreciates .3
percent more than in the base path, while home prices rise by
2.6 percent more. The home fiscal expansion reduces the foreign
real wage by 1.0 percent, just as the monetary expansion raised
the foreigi real wage. If foreign wage adjustments were sluggish,
the fiscal expansion at home would increase foreign unemployment.
When real wages adjust slowly to unemployment in both countries,
then, a fiscal expansion in one is negatively transmitted to the
other!
The expansionary effects of a rise in G are not rapidly reversed
in subsequent periods, as with a monetary expansion. Of course
in the long-run, output and the capital stock adjust to the steady-
state levels in the base case (with a small adjustment due to a
-48-
terms-of-trade effect °'' The terms-of-trade shift is
permanent, and in the long-run is fully reflected in the difference
in real wages in the two economies. Furthermore, there is no per-
sistence in the one-shot jump in prices that accompanies the fiscal
expansion. By the third year, domestic inflation is almost identical
with the inflation rate in the base case.
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS
The simulations in this paper demonstrate the feasibility of
studying applied problems in macroeconomic adjustment in large
models with efficient asset markets and intertemporal optimization
by economic agents. The assumption of efficient asset markets
imposes a great computational burden in theoretical models, because
of the difficulty of solving the two-point boundary value problems
that result. Thus, studies of flexible exchange rates, or energy
prices, or capital accumulation in open economies, typically
simplify greatly the structure of the economy in all aspects but
the one under study. At the beginning of this essay I suggested
that the analysis of the OPEC price hikes demands an integrated
approach, with a specification of all major aspects of the macro-
economy. Leaving out capital accumulation, or OPEC savings behavior,
for example, would change the patterns of adjustment of all other
macroeconomic variables.
The model is this paper illustrates many key facets of adjust-
ment to an energy price rise. First, higher energy prices almost
surely require a long-run decline in capital intensity (relative
to trend) in the developed economies, in order that pre-shock pro-
fitability may be partially or wholly restored. Second, the short-
run movement in capital accumulation results from the interplay of
many factors, including the short-run profitability decline, diffe-
rential savings behavior in OPEC and the developed economies, and
real wage behavior in the developed economies. The first factor
tends to reduce I at time zero, and to encourage consumption. The
second, OPEC's higher short-run propensity to save, reduces world
-50-
interest rates, and counterbalances the first effect. Finally,
short-run real wage rigidity reduces output at the time of an oil
shock, forces up world interest rates, and lowers investment.
The view of macropolicy set forth in Section 4 ties expansion
to a reduction in real factor costs, whether through inflation (with
monetary and exchange-rate policy) or a terms-of-trade improvement
(with fiscal policy). With the parameters assumed for simulation,
we were able to quantify the effects of alternative policies.
Obviously the most important next task for this research stra-
tegy is a more realistic calibration of the model. Michael Eruno
and this author are now undertaking this project with data for the
OECD economies. We are using original econometric work as well
as published estimates to set the parameters of the model. The plan
is to expand the model to include three importing regions (Europe,
Japan, the U.S.) as well as OPEC.
The theoretical framework warrants refinement as well. The
assumption of continuous output-market clearing should be relaxed
for the very short-run, allowing households to make intertemporal
decisions with rational expectations of market constraints. In
another aspect of the model, more work remains in the specification
of aggregate technology. It will be useful to distinguish traded
and non-traded goods in the developed economies, as well as to
extend the technology to the case of putty-clay capital. Further
discussion of alternative technological assumptions is offered in
[22]. Finally, the treatment of OPEC can be deepened in a number of
ways. OPEC holdings of oil can be treated within a dynamic portfolio
model, which stresses the real return to oil and alternative assets.
-51-
The nonrenewable nature of oil should be explicitly modeled, as




1/ To derive the forumula for wT we begin with
(26) WI = + nM)/Pdt
First, let us evaluate fe -dsI/Pdt and then we will add
the result to ie'nM/Pdt.
•The
first integral is solved
by integration by parts. Let dv = Mdt and u = e r fl s1
Rewriting ij°udv = uv] - J°vdu , we find
(27) eOt5/pdt = (M/P)e
+ f(M/P)e (r-n)dt + (M/P)(/P)edt
Now add d5(nM/p)dt to both sides of (31), and evaluate:
(28) wT = M(O)/P(O) + (iM/P)ed5dt
But iM/P = 5CF . Substituting, we have
(29) wT = -M(O)/P(O) + sCFC n)dsd
The last integral is nothing but s multiplying the discounted value
of future consumption, or sW. But (S-n)sW equals current expendi-
ture on M/P, to-wit: iM/P = (-n)sW. Thus, from ( ) we may
derive:
(30) wT = -M(0)/P(0) + [i(O)M(0)/P(0)]/(-n)
This is given in the text.
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2/ The utility function is written to provide an intertemporal




A = rA - [C + CM/ri + i(M/P)J
The first order conditions are:
(32) (a) LFU''PC =
(b) LFU'FCM
(c) LFU''YM/P = Xi
(d) 3x = - r
Now, we use the properties of the true price index for P. In
ticular, P, is linear homogenous in the prices of C, cM, M/P, i.e.,
P = P(1,1/ll,i). Also, the derivatives of PqJ with respect to
the prices of C, cM, and M/P are C/'P, CM/F, and (M/P)/'Y respective-
ly. Combining these properties:
(33) P = C/'i' + (M/qJ) (1/ri) + i(M/P)/q
Now, multiplying ( )(a), (b), and (c) by C, cM, and M/P respective-











Using ( ) (d), ( ) and the definition of U() from equation (4)
in the text, we derive (5) on p. 10.
3/ To derive (17), we re-write (12) using the condition that V = qK,
so V/V = q/q + K/K.
(35) r=/V+Djw'V-k/K.
Also, K/K = J/K - d - n. Using (16) and (35), direct substitution
gives:
(36) r = n + V/V + [Q - (W/P)L - (PN/P)N - Il/V
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This is a simple first order differential equation, with the
solution:
(37) v = etdsVO - V0etds
!tei•(rn)dz[Q - (W/P)L - (PN/P)N - I]ds
Now, if we impose the condition that urn e10 (r-n)V =
- t-we have
(38) V0 = ;teJ (rn)dz[Q - (W/P)L - (PN/P)N - I]ds
which was to be proved.
4/ The price index is written here in terms of commodities, as is
conventional, though the price index for full instantaneous con-
sumption would include the price of money balances, i.
S/ Actually, the specific vector of state variables depends on
certain key parameters in the model. The vector shown above (24)
is correct for - = = . For
-
and
- finite, lagged real
wages (W/Pc)1 and (W*/Pc*)l and lagged inflation are state
variables.
6/ See for example [ ]. The difference in result may depend upon
the more limited menu of assets available in the economy in [ ].This cannot be conclusively determined since the savings behavior
in that model is not explicitly derived.
7/ After the fiscal expansion, the capital/labor ratios remain at
the appropriate level for F/q + (q) = . Also, since the tax
change is permanent, "permanent income" of households falls by
as much as current income, so there is no motive for saving or
dissaving by households over time.
8/ This independence of oil holdings and current account balance is
sensitive to a number of assumptions. If the domestic oil hold-
ings are depleting, current income exceeds permanent income, and
the developed oil-producing country runs a surplus. Also, if the
oil price rise is perceived to be temporary, then a similar result
obtains.
9/ Thejump is very large for two reasons. First, the acceleration
in M is known to be permanent, so it is fully capitalized in the
first period. Second, the interest elasticity of money demand with
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